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COMMENTS
The Wedding Veil or the Corporate Veil?: Appreciation of Close Corporation
Stock Under North Carolina's Equitable Distribution Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the spring of 1985, the increase in value of shares in a close cor-
poration' was not subject to equitable distribution under North Carolina
law if the stock was acquired as separate property. North Carolina's eq-
uitable distribution statute provides that "[t]he increase in value of sepa-
rate property .. . shall be considered separate property."2 A rule
developed in three recent North Carolina Court of Appeals cases contra-
dicts the apparent meaning of this statute.3 As a result of these decisions,
the major portion of share value may now be subject to equitable distri-
bution regardless of how the shares are acquired. The implications of
these decisions for North Carolina close corporations are far-reaching.
To illustrate, consider the fictitious "Widget Corporation." John Jen-
nings is president, chairman of the board and sixty-percent shareholder
of Widget. The company was founded by John's father and his two
brothers. John acquired his interest in the company through his father's
will. Shortly after his father's death, John married Susan. Under John's
leadership, Widget expanded into new markets, and revenues grew. The
company experienced a substantial increase in annual sales and net
worth. After a fifteen-year marriage, Susan Jennings sued for divorce. In
an equitable distribution proceeding, Susan claimed that the value of
Widget had increased to twelve times its original value and that half of
the increase in John's stock was marital property. The trial court agreed
and awarded Susan a money judgment for one half the increase in value
of the stock. John was unable to secure a loan to pay the judgment, and
1. One authority has defined the close corporation as one composed of few shareholders who
are generally well-acquainted with each other and all of whom are active in the business, and one
without an established market for its shares. I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (1975).
The vast majority of corporations in North Carolina are close corporations. "Of the estimated more
than one million corporations in the United States, all but about 50,000 would fall into the category
of closely-held." Hempstead, Valuation of a Closely-Held Business, 2 EQurr. DIST. REP. No. 3, at
36 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
3. MeLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333
S.E.2d 488 (1985); Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72
N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
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the other shareholders could not finance a purchase of John's shares.
The Jennings' divorce has cast a shadow on the otherwise prosperous
future of Widget, Inc.
The uncertainty confronting the Widget Corporation and other close
corporations in North Carolina is the product of three recent North Car-
olina Court of Appeals decisions: Wade v. Wade,4 Phillips v. Phillips,'
and McLeod v. McLeod.6 These decisions hold that the "active apprecia-
tion" of close corporation stock which accrues during marriage and
before separation is marital property subject to equitable distribution.
The method by which shares are acquired is immaterial. The court's
interpretation of the statute in these cases was based on two concepts
new to North Carolina law. First, the court adopted the "source of
funds" theory of acquisition. Under this theory, property is acquired as
it is paid for and, therefore, may include both separate and marital inter-
ests. Second, the court recognized a distinction between appreciation
due to economic factors (i.e., "passive appreciation") and appreciation
due to the contributions of either spouse (i.e., "active appreciation").
The court held in each case that active appreciation which occurs during
the marriage is "acquired" by the marital estate and is not separate prop-
erty within the meaning of North Carolina General Statute section 50-
20(b)(2), a provision of the equitable distribution statute. Application of
this section was limited to passive appreciation.
The Wade line of cases raises a number of significant questions for the
close corporation in North Carolina. What factors should go into valua-
tion of active appreciation? What should be the significance of compen-
sation received from the corporation by the titled spouse? Will the
corporate veil, otherwise meticulously maintained, succumb to the "wed-
ding veil?" Should retained earnings belong to the marital estate or to the
corporation? What form should the distributive award take? What are
the implications of these decisions for other shareholders in close corpo-
rations? As will be shown under these cases, treatment of stock in a close
corporation is decidedly different than treatment of stock in a publicly-
held corporation.
Part II of this Comment examines the relevant North Carolina Court
of Appeals cases. Part III explores the source of the court's rationale.
Part IV discusses the policy issues raised for close corporations and ap-
plies the concepts discussed to the fictitious "Widget Corporation."
4. 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
5. 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985).
6. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CASES
A. Wade v. Wade7
The issue in Wade concerned real property rather than corporate
stock, but this decision introduced the distinction between active and
passive appreciation and the source of funds rule. During their marriage,
Billy and Carolyn Wade built a home on a parcel of land he owned prior
to the marriage. Carolyn Wade contributed substantial sums of money
to construction and maintenance of the home. After eight years, the
marriage was dissolved. The trial court awarded Carolyn Wade the
home and subjacent land as marital property. The remaining land was
characterized as separate property and was awarded to her husband.
On appeal, Billy Wade argued that the home represented an increase
in value of his separate property and should also be considered separate
property. His argument was based on the increase-in-value provision of
section 50-20(b)(2).' Carolyn Wade argued that the character of the land
had been transformed from separate into marital property with the addi-
tion of the home.9 The court held that the increase-in-value provision of
the statute refers only to passive appreciation and not to active apprecia-
tion."° Passive appreciation was defined as income resulting from eco-
nomic influences, such as inflation.II Active appreciation was defined as
an increase resulting from the contributions, monetary or otherwise, by
one or both spouses. 2 The trial court's division of the property was
therefore upheld.
The rationale used in Wade was based upon dicta in an earlier case. In
Turner v. Turner,3 the court of appeals suggested that a marital interest
in real estate owned as separate property could arise if improvements or
payments by the non-titled spouse contributed to an increase in value.'
4
The Wade court justified its broad interpretation of the increase-in-value
provision on the basis of the remedial character of the equitable distribu-
tion statute. "As this court has previously recognized, G.S. section 50-20
was enacted in recognition of marriage as a partnership and is based at
least in part on the policy of repayment of contribution."'" The apprecia-
tion of the Wade property was attributable, in part, to contributions by
7. 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
8. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
9. This argument is known as the transmutation doctrine. See infra pp. 219-20.
10. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372 at 379, 325 S.E.2d 260 at 268.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 64 N.C. App. 342, 307 S.E.2d 407 (1983).
14. "If, however, an equity in this property developed during the marriage because of improve-
ments or payments contributed to by defendant, that equity (as distinguished from a mere increase in
value of separate property, excluded by the statute) could be marital property, in our opinion, upon
appropriate, supportable findings being made." Id. at 346, 307 S.E.2d at 409.
15. Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 379, 325 S.E.2d at 268 (citations omitted).
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the marital estate (i.e., construction and maintenance of the home). In
turn, the marital estate was "entitled to a proportionate return of its in-
vestment."16 This return took the form of an interest in the property
itself.
In finding that the real property appreciation was "acquired" during
the marriage, the court adopted the source of funds rule. This theory of
acquisition is based on "a dynamic rather than a static interpretation of
the term 'acquired' as used in G.S. 50-20(b)(1). . . . [A]cquisition must
be recognized as the ongoing process of making payment for property or
contributing to the marital estate rather than being fixed on the date that
legal title to property is obtained."17
B. Phillips v. Phillips"s
Phillips was the first case under section 50-20(b)(2) to deal with appre-
ciation of a corporate interest brought into the marriage by one spouse. 19
The principal dispute was the characterization of the husband's interest
in property purchased through the corporation of which he was ninety-
eight percent stockholder. With funds both "borrowed" and "with-
drawn" from this corporation, George Phillips acquired real property, a
Swiss annuity, and another corporation. These loans and withdrawals
were repaid from separate property, earnings after the marriage, and
profits, rents, and sales of portions of these acquired properties.
The trial court concluded that the assets in question were separate
property because they had been acquired with separate property. The
trial judge relied on language in section 50-20 which includes property
exchanged for separate property within the definition of separate prop-
erty.20 On appeal, Jane Phillips argued that there was no exchange of
separate property and that the loans and withdrawals used to acquire the
16. Id. at 380, 325 S.E.2d at 268 (citations omitted). The court rejected the theory of transmu-
tation through commingling. This theory would have completely transformed the character of the
property from separate to marital. See infra at pp. 219-20.
17. Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 380, 325 S.E.2d at 268-69 (citations omitted).
18. 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985).
19. However, the decisions in Phillips and McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d
910, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985), were signaled in Wade, 72 N.C. App.
372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985), by the court's reference to the result in, a pre-equitable distribution case,
Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979). The Wade court cited
Leatherman as an example of the harsh results which equitable distribution was intended to avoid.
72 N.C. App. at 379, 325 S.E.2d at 267. Without compensation, Mrs. Leatherman worked full-time
for eight years in a key role for a corporation formed by her husband after their marriage. Her claim
at divorce for one-half of the stock was rejected by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The court
held that services rendered by a wife in her husband's business are gratuitously performed in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary. Leatherman, 297 N.C. at 622, 256 S.E.2d at 796. Had
Leatherman been decided under the equitable distribution law, the wife would have been entitled to
half the stock because the corporation was created with marital income. This would have been the
pre- Wade result.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
216
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contested assets were marital property.21 George Phillips argued that the
acquisitions represented an increase in the value of his separate property,
the principal corporation, which retained its separate property status
under the statute.22
The court of appeals agreed that the acquisitions represented an in-
crease in value of the corporation. However, citing Wade, the court rec-
ognized the increase as being comprised of both active and passive
components.23 The case was remanded to determine the active compo-
nent of the increase in value of the corporation and the extent to which
profits from it had been siphoned off to purchase other assets.
In Phillips, the court underscored the remedial nature of the equitable
distribution statute, noting the immunization of separate property that
would result if section 50-20(b)(2) were interpreted literally. Under such
a reading, the court said, separate property would retain its character
"even if the spouse who acquired [the assets] was only able to do so be-
cause his or her spouse devoted time and money to maintaining the
household, enabling him or her to engage in profitable business deal-
ings."' 24 The court went on to say that such a result would render equita-
ble distribution useless to someone who married "a businessman or
entrepreneur who brings considerable corporate property into the mar-
riage, and acquires most of the assets used in the marriage by profit-
making manipulation of corporate funds."
25
C. McLeod v. McLeod26
The principles developed in Wade v. Wade and Phillips v. Phillips were
extended in McLeod to corporate stock inherited during marriage. The
main issue on appeal was the effect of redemption by the husband's cor-
poration of all its outstanding shares except those owned by him. During
his marriage to the defendant, Edward McLeod inherited shares repre-
senting thirty- percent ownership in a trucking company. Later, the cor-
poration redeemed, as treasury stock, all outstanding shares except those
owned by Edward McLeod, president of the company. The redemption
was financed with a loan co-guaranteed by his wife, Louisa, combined
with company funds. The trial court held that the trucking company
was the separate property of Edward McLeod.
On appeal, Louisa McLeod argued that the character of the stock had
21. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985). At the time
her case was appealed, Jane Phillips did not have the benefit of the Wade decision, since the filing of
Wade preceded Phillips by only fourteen days.
22. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. at 71-72, 326 S.E.2d at 59.
23. Id. at 73-74, 326 S.E.2d at 60-61.
24. Id. at 72, 326 S.E.2d at 60.
25. Id.
26. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
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been transformed from separate to marital property with the stock re-
demption. 7 In the alternative, she contended that equity dictated that
she share in the increase, even if the court chose to characterize the re-
demption as an increase in value of the stock under section 50-20(b)(2).
This corporation . . . was the primary source of livelihood for Ed Mc-
Leod, III, and his wife and children. He took from it as salary each year
all that it could reasonably afford to pay and continue as a viable busi-
ness .... If the corporation yielded less because it was struggling to
repay a loan procured for redemption of some of its capital stock, suste-
nance for the family was cut back proportionately. In the arena where
equity is the name of the game, it was not the corporation but the family
of Ed McLeod, III, and Mrs. McLeod in particular who paid for the
stock redeemed by the corporation.28
The court of appeals held that Edward McLeod's initial interest in the
company acquired through inheritance was separate property.2 9 How-
ever, any increase in value due to active appreciation during the marriage
was held to be subject to equitable distribution. The court cited the re-
demption of stock by Edward McLeod as an example of active apprecia-
tion. "The redemption was a business decision from which plaintiff as
president derived substantial economic advantage, which in terms of our
statute and cases, is property acquired during the marriage."30 The case
was remanded to determine (1) the value of Edward McLeod's minority
interest when it was inherited, (2) the value of the controlling interest
when he and his wife separated, (3) the difference between the two val-
ues, and (4) the amount of the difference attributable to active
appreciation.31
In these three cases, the court of appeals significantly narrowed the
definition of separate property under the North Carolina equitable distri-
bution statute. All three cases dealt with separate property which appre-
ciated during marriage. At the root of these decisions are two concepts
of property new to North Carolina jurisprudence-the "source of funds"
rule and the dual nature of "appreciation." With the adoption of these
concepts, the court analyzed the property on two levels. First, the acqui-
sition of property now connotes both the point at which an equitable
interest is first obtained and the period during which subsequent contri-
27. This is the same transmutation argument made by the appellant in Phillips. See infra pp.
219-20.
28. Brief for Appellant at 5, McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
29. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. at 150, 327 S.E.2d at 914.
30. Id. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915.
31. Id. at 150-51, 327 S.E.2d at 914. The court rejected the wife's contention that her signature
on the note securing the loan created a marital interest. However, the court noted that in some
situations an equitable lien in favor of the one contributing to the separate property might be created.
Id. at 151, 327 S.E.2d 914-15.
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butions are made to its value. Second, the property may be comprised of
two interests- both marital and separate.
III. THE SOURCE OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. When Is Property Acquired?-Three Theories
The touchstone of the court's rationale in Wade v. Wade is its treat-
ment of the term "acquired." The Wade court considered three theories
of acquisition: inception of title, transmutation, source of funds. Under
the inception of title theory of acquisition, property is acquired when the
owner first obtains an equitable interest in the property. The character of
the property is forever fixed at that point.32
[T]he status of title, as belonging to one estate or the other, is determined
by the status of the original right, subsequently matured into full title.
Under this rule, property to which one spouse has acquired an equitable
right before marriage is separate property, though such right is not per-
fected until after marriage.
33
The character of the property is thus not affected by an enhancement in
its value. For instance, a spouse who brought real property into the mar-
riage would retain title to it despite the fact that most of the mortgage
payments were made with marital property after the marriage. The re-
tention of title to separate property by the acquiring spouse under these
circumstances has led to criticism of the inception of title theory.
34
The theory of transmutation is based on a party's intent, express or
implied, to alter the status of the property. The commingling of separate
and marital property raises an inference that the titled spouse intended to
create a marital interest in his separate property.35 Commingling also
creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to change the character of the
property. 36 In Wade, the court of appeals held that there was no basis in
section 50-20 to support adoption of transmutation in North Carolina.
37
The court noted that this theory of acquisition was based on a preference
32. L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.06 0983).
33. Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 135-36, 383 P.2d 840, 842 (1963).
34. Sharp, Equitable Distribution in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. REV.
247, 255 (1983); see also L. GOLDEN, supra note 32, § 5.07. Under the Spanish community property
system, while title was fixed at inception, the community was entitled to reimbursement under some
circumstances. Reimbursement was required where acquisition was initiated before the marriage and
completed afterward with part of the consideration coming from marital property. The labor or
industry of either spouse during marriage constituted marital property. The measure of reimburse-
ment was the value of the community's contribution toward completion of the acquisition. W.
DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 64 (2d eO. 1971).
35. L. GOLDEN, supra note 32, § 5.33.
36. Id. See also W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 61. To effect transmutation,
generally some affirmative act must be undertaken. The act may take the form of contract, transfer
of title or commingling. 1 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 18.07(3) (J.
McCahey ed. 1984).
37. Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269; see also Sharp, supra note 32, at 258.
219
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for classifying property as marital. The court concluded that the North
Carolina statute demonstrated a contrary preference, i.e., that separate
property remains separate property.
Applied to the mortgage payment example used to illustrate the incep-
tion of title theory, transmutation would yield diametrically opposite re-
sults. Despite the fact that real property was brought into the marriage
by one spouse, it would be transformed entirely into marital property
because most of the mortgage payments were made with marital
property.
Transmutation has not been widely accepted as the solution to the al-
leged inequities of the inception of title theory. Transmutation has been
faulted for ignoring the respective contributions of marriage partners to
the acquisition of property.38 Critics of both the inception of title and
transmutation theories agree that the source of funds concept of acquisi-
tion eliminates the inequities of the other two theories.
With Wade, North Carolina joined a minority of equitable distribution
states and a majority of community property states in adopting a dy-
namic definition of the term "acquired."39 Under the source of funds
rule, acquisition occurs along a continuum, rather than at a fixed point;
property is acquired as it is paid for. Consequently, property may con-
tain both marital and separate interests, depending upon the source of
the contribution.'
The policy foundations of the source of funds rule are fairness to the
parties and consistency with the expectations of the parties.41
That theory [source of funds] is premised on the concept that it is unfair
to permit a spouse who has contributed separate funds to the purchase or
improvement of property to enjoy all of the benefits of sole ownership of
the property without regard to the fact that it had been purchased or
improved in part with community funds.42
The source of funds rule is considered the most equitable of the three
theories because of the greater flexibility it affords in determining prop-
erty interests. The marital estate is deemed to have an interest in prop-
erty acquired by either spouse in proportion to their contributions to the
total value of the property.
Applied to the mortgage payment illustration, the source of funds rule
yields results between those dictated by the inception of title and trans-
mutation theories. The value of the property represented by pre-marital
38. L. GOLDEN, supra note 32, § 5.07.
39. See id. § 1.07.
40. Sharp, supra note 34, at 255; see also Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marital Dissolution, 43
Mo. L. REv. 157, 180 (1978).
41. Sharp, supra note 34, at 259.
42. Harper v. Harper, 49 Md. App. 339, 431 A.2d 761 (1981), rev'd in part on other grounds,
294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982).
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payments remains separate property. However, the remaining value is
considered to be acquired by the marital estate and is classified as marital
property.
All three theories of acquisition have their origin in community prop-
erty states.a3 Inception of title and transmutation were adopted by those
states from the Spanish Community Property System. The general rule
of acquisition under Spanish law was inception of title. Transmutation
was developed as an exception to the general rule where separate and
community property were so intermingled that the respective compo-
nents could not be traced; the intermingled property was presumed to be
community property.' Transmutation is now followed by a distinct mi-
nority of American community property states.4a While the source of
funds rule was first used in community property states,a it represents a
departure from Spanish community property law.47 The earliest adop-
tion of this concept by an equitable distribution state was in 1979 by
Maine.4 ' The adoption of the source of funds doctrine provided the
foundation for the active/passive appreciation distinction in North
Carolina.
B. Distinguishing Between Active and Passive Appreciation
The source of funds rule was first applied to determine the marital
interest in property acquired before marriage. However, it has also been
applied to determine the marital interest in increases in separate prop-
erty. The same remedial objectives which prompted development of the
rule underly its application to increases in separate property. The con-
cept of appreciation, like that of equity, has been bifurcated to serve this
end. "Passive" appreciation is defined as an increase in value which oc-
curs without any contribution by either party.49 "Active" appreciation is
defined as appreciation attributable to some affirmative effort by one or
43. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 64. Community property is a system where
the property of both spouses belongs to each in halves. Each spouse's interest is devisable during the
marriage and, the spouses are joint owners of all property acquired during the marriage. The com-
munity property system is employed in Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas and Washington. Id. § 1. Only Texas and New Mexico strictly adhere to the inception of title
concept today. L. GOLDEN, supra note 32, § 5.33.
44. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 64.
45. Illinois is the leader in the application of transmutation. In Re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d
518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981); In Re Marriage of Lee, 88 111. App. 3d 1044, 410 N.E.2d 1183 (1980),
affid, 87 Ill. 2d 64, 430 N.E.2d 1030 (1981). Transmutation is also recognized in Missouri, Ander-
son v. Anderson 605 S.W.2d 524 (1980); Oregon, In Re Marriage of Jenks, 294 Or. 236, 656 P.2d
286 (1982); and the District of Columbia, Darling v. Darling, 444 A.2d 20 (D.C. App. 1982).
46. D. King, The Challenge of Apportionment, 37 WASH. L. REV. 483, 484 (1962); see also W.
DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 64.
47. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 64.
48. Tibbets v. Tibbets, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
49. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 18.06.
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both parties.50
The active/passive distinction is a vestige of Spanish community prop-
erty law. Under that system, property acquired during the marriage was
characterized in one of two ways. Property acquired through labor, in-
dustry or valuable consideration contributed by either party was consid-
ered "onerous property." Property acquired without the efforts of the
marriage partners, e.g., by gift or inheritance, was characterized as "lu-
crative property."" At the foundation of the onerous/lucrative distinc-
tion was the proposition that effort by one of the marital partners
"depleted" the marital estate. The "cost" to the marital estate gave it an
interest in the resulting gains or earnings of each spouse. The earnings or
gains of the spouse:
are gained at the expense of the community in that the one making the
earnings or gains is furthered therein by the use of community property
or by the joint efforts of the other spouse, joint efforts on the part of the
other spouse which may consist, as in the case of the wife, in maintaining
the home and rearing the children, for that is a sharing of the burdens of
the marital partnership and a contribution to the community effort.52
The effort of one spouse, therefore, was attributable to both. The concept
of depletion was based on the partnership theory of marriage central to
the law of community property. 3 The earnings of one spouse were pre-
sumed to be for the benefit of both.54
The principles underlying the onerous/lucrative distinction were also
applied to the determination of the amount of reimbursement to the com-
munity where it contributed to increases in the value of separate prop-
erty. While ownership was determined by the inception of title theory,
the community was entitled to reimbursement for its contribution to the
increase in separate property. Increases that resulted from the "intrin-
sic" nature of the separate property or from contributions of other sepa-
rate property by the titled spouse were not part of the community.
Intrinsic gains were considered to be those derived from "the benefit of
nature or of time, without industry or work."5 On the other hand, in-
creases originating from the industry or work of either spouse or from
50. Id.
51. L. GOLDEN, supra note 32, § 5.21; W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 62; see
also Krauskopf, supra note 40, at 178.
52. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 62.
53. Id.
54. This view was consistent with the Spanish community property approach to income from
separate property, i.e., that such income was community property. This approach was abandoned by
most community property states in the United States. They classify income from separate property
as separate property. Id. § 64. This treatment of income from separate property is termed the
"American Rule" as distinguished from the "Spanish Rule" whereby such income is considered
marital property. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36,
§ 20.04[2][b].
55. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 73 n.34.
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contributions of community property belonged to the community. 6
Again, the concept of depletion of the marital estate was key to the dis-
tinction. Where increases were attributable to the community, reim-
bursement in the amount of one half of the enhanced value was the
rule.
57
Passive appreciation represents an "intrinsic" increase in the value of
the separate property. Active appreciation is the enhancement of value
attributable to the "industry or labor" of one or both of the spouses.
This distinction is recognized by a majority of states which have statutes
that classify property as marital or separate. 8 It is, in many instances, a
product of case law rather than statutory provision. For example, the
increase in value of separate property is excluded from equitable distribu-
tion by statutes of eight common law states, including North Carolina.59
Nevertheless, appellate decisions in six of these states have interpreted
their statutes so as to include increases attributable to active appreciation
in marital property." Active appreciation is recognized expressly in the
statutes of two common law states, New York and Kentucky. These
statutes provide that the increase remains separate property except to the
extent that the increase resulted from marital effort.61 However, in the
absence of statutory provision, the active/passive distinction is generally
recognized where a direct contribution of money or effort by a non-titled
spouse has contributed to the increase.62
IV. Policy Issues for Close Corporations
Four policy issues raised by the Wade line of cases will be examined
within this section: (1) the definition of active appreciation, (2) the use of
compensation as a method of apportioning the marital interest in active
appreciation, (3) the application of the corporate separateness doctrine to
the remedial objectives of equitable distribution, and (4) the form of the
distributive award and its impact on other shareholders. Throughout this
56. Id. § 73; see also Krauskopf, supra note 40, at 180.
57. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 73.
58. Sharp, supra note 34, at 260. The classification-based system subjects to distribution only
property acquired during the marriage through the efforts of the marital "team." Both community
property and equitable distribution are classification based systems; see L. GOLDEN, supra note 32,
§ 2.01.
59. L. KORNIELD & M. KRANZ, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: AN UPDATE 7 (1982). See also
the position of the UNIT. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (original version), 9A U.L.A. 143-44
(1973).
60. Eg., Tibbets v. Tibbets, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979); J.D.P. v. F.J.H., 399 A.2d 207 (Del.
1979).
61. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(2)(e) (1984); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW. § 236, Part
B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-84). Colorado is the only state in which the entire increase is
considered marital property. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10.113(4) (1973).
62. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 18.06.
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section the reader will be asked to consider the predicament of "Widget,
Inc." in light of the body of law on each of these four issues.
A. Valuation
The distinction between active and passive appreciation adds to the
difficulty inherent in the valuation of close corporations. Judges now
face not only the challenging task of valuing the corporation, but also the
determination of the amount the stock has appreciated since its acquisi-
tion and then apportionment of that increase between the separate and
marital estates. It is not the purpose of this Comment to consider in
depth the exceedingly complex subject of valuation of close corporations.
However, a brief orientation to the problem sets the stage for the main
topic of this section.
For purposes of equitable distribution, the value of the corporation
must be determined at two points-at the time it was brought into the
marriage and the time the parties were separated. The value of stock in
publicly-traded companies is determined by the market price at which it
is traded at the time of valuation. No such basis of valuation exists for
close corporations. By definition, there is no public trading market for
stock in a close corporation.63
Determination of the fair market value of a close corporation is funda-
mentally a subjective process which considers a number of factors.
Among these are the history and nature of the enterprise, the economic
outlook and condition of the industry, the general financial condition of
the corporation, the book value of its stock, and its earning and dividend-
paying capacities. 64 Another intangible factor that must be considered is
goodwill. Goodwill of a publicly-held corporation is reflected in its trad-
ing price. However, in a close corporation, goodwill must be treated as a
component part of the stock value of the corporation. Measuring these
factors is a complex process often requiring accountants, appraisers, and
consultants.
The determination of the active and passive components of apprecia-
tion may also require expert testimony. The opinions in Wade v. Wade,
Phillips v. Phillips and McLeod v. McLeod have provided little guidance
on how to discern the two forms of appreciation. The court's discussion
of the subject in Phillips underscores the complexity of the task. On re-
mand, Judge Arnold instructed the trial court:
to determine the "active appreciation" of the Pak-a-Sak corporation dur-
ing the marriage of the parties, that is, the increase in net value due to the
63. See supra note I.
64. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROP-
ERTY, supra note 36, § 22.01-.11; see also Scbreier & Jay, Judicial Valuation of "Close" Corporation
Stock Alice in Wonderland Revisited, 31 OKLA L. REV. 853 (1978); Hempstead, supra note 1.
224
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contributions in personal effort or money earned during the marriage by
either or both of the spouses. In turn, the court should determine the
extent to which that increase in net value was siphoned off and used to
purchase the assets at issue . and the degree to which those assets
increased in value due to plaintiff's or defendant's personal managerial
efforts or investment.
65
In McLeod, the court cited as a specific example of active appreciation
the increased value of the husband's interest in the company resulting
from the corporation's redemption of all outstanding shares. The court
held that the redemption "was a business decision from which plaintiff as
president derived substantial economic advantage "and attributed the in-
creased value to active appreciation.66
On the basis of these two cases, active appreciation in North Carolina
is apparently defined as "substantial economic advantage" 67 to the titled
spouse derived through the "personal managerial efforts or investment"
6
by either spouse. To shed more light on the meaning of active and pas-
sive appreciation and their implications, the treatment of appreciation by
other jurisdictions will be examined below.
1. What is Active Appreciation?
Among the states that recognize active appreciation, most require
some showing of a contribution to the appreciation by the non-titled
spouse.69 This requirement raises both the issue of the type of the contri-
bution (direct or indirect) and the source of the contribution (the titled
spouse or the non-titled spouse).
By whom must contributions be made to entitle the marital estate to a
share of the increase? Some states explicitly require by statute that con-
tributions be made by the non-titled spouse for the community to share in
the appreciation.7° The New York statute states that the appreciation in
value of separate property remains separate "except to the extent attribu-
table in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse."'" In
Oklahoma, case law holds that, where a non-owning spouse makes no
contribution toward the appreciation of separate property, separate prop-
erty retains its original character.72
65. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. at 74, 326 S.E.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
66. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. at 74, 326 S.E.2d at 61.
69. See, ag., MICH. Comp. LAWS § 552.401 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 236,
Part B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-84); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(c)(5) (1984). Colorado is
the only state that by statute specifically includes the appreciation of value of separate property in
the definition of marital property. See supra note 61.
70. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 552.401 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 236, Part
B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-84).
71. N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 236, Part B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-84).
72. Templeton v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1982).
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In other states, only the joint efforts of both spouses will impress the
enhancement of value with a marital character.73 Therefore, efforts by
one spouse alone would not result in characterization of the increase as
marital property.
A third approach is the one adopted by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals.74 A contribution by either spouse yields a marital interest in the
appreciated value.7 5 This approach is based on the community property
principle of marriage as an economic partnership. This concept of con-
tribution relates to the idea that effort by one spouse "depletes" the mari-
tal estate.76
Another issue raised by the active appreciation concept is the type of
contribution which creates a marital interest in the appreciation. Dis-
tinctions normally are drawn between direct and indirect, substantial and
insubstantial contributions.
Most courts require a showing that there has been some direct contri-
bution by the non-titled spouse to the growth in value of the separate
property.77 Some states require the direct application of money, effort or
skill to the enterprise. 78 The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that a
wife was entitled to a portion of the increased value of her husband's
bowling alley, which he acquired before marriage, because she worked a
regular shift in the business. 79 However, participation alone may not be
enough; proof of efforts beyond that expected of a normal employee may
be required to establish a direct contribution. 0 For example, proof that
the non-titled spouse worked without compensation or for inadequate
compensation may be sufficient. 81
There have been relatively few decisions on the effect of indirect con-
tributions.8 2 In one case, however, a New York court held that a wife's
performance of social functions on behalf of her husband's company and
her services as a travelling companion to him on business trips were too
remote to be considered factors in the increase in value of his close corpo-
ration stock.
83
Some states distinguish among direct contributions on the basis of
73. !-g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(b)(1) (1984).
74. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. at 74, 326 S.E.2d at 61.
75. Scherzer v. Scherzer, 346 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 69 N.J. 391, 354 A.2d 319
(1976); Pascoe v. Pascoe, I1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1091 (Pa. C.P. 1985).
76. See supra pp. 221-22 and accompanying notes.
77. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 18.06.
78. Templeton v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1982); Wright v. Wright, 577 P.2d 922
(Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
79. Gregg v. Gregg, 113 Mich. App. 23, 348 N.W.2d 295 (1984).
80. 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 22.09[4].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Jolis v. Jolis, 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1982).
226
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whether enough effort or money was applied to the enterprise. This
"substantiality test" may be applied to measure the contribution of either
spouse. "In either instance, the critical inquiry is whether the marital
contribution is sufficiently substantial to warrant inclusion of the increase
in value. . . as marital property." 4 Statutes in both Tennessee and Illi-
nois address the degree of contribution required. In Tennessee the appre-
ciation of separate property retains its original character unless each
party has "substantially contributed" to it.85 The Illinois legislature re-
cently amended that state's statute to provide that all appreciation of
separate property shall remain separate property regardless of the how
the increase came about.86 However, if the marital estate contributes
substantial effort which results in substantial appreciation, there is a lim-
ited right of reimbursement under the new law.87 This is also the posi-
tion taken in the new Uniform Marital Property Act.88 Under the act, an
increase in separate property generally remains separate property. How-
ever, if the increase is substantial and results from substantial and under-
compensated efforts of the other spouse, the resulting appreciation is
marital property.89
A key contribution issue is whether homemaker services are "direct"
or "substantial" enough to be treated as contributions which create a
marital interest in the increase in separate property. It is not uncommon
to consider homemaker services as a factor in distribution of martial
property, and the North Carolina statute includes such a provision.90
However, few states have considered the influence of such services on the
threshold issue of whether property should be characterized as marital or
84. Sharp, supra note 34, at 261. In an Illinois case the husband owned music stores before the
marriage. The corporation increased in value during the marriage due to reinvestment of business
earnings, personal efforts of the husband and small family loans. In holding that the husband's
contributions were not substantial, the court stated that it was possible "for one spouse to improve
the other spouse's non-marital property without making that property marital." In re Marriage of
Kennedy, 94 Ill. App.3d 537, 547, 418 N.E.2d 947, 954-55 (1981). In a Missouri case the claim to a
share of the increased value of her husband's close corporation stock was based in part on her
contributions as an entertainer and traveling companion to her husband, the president of the com-
pany. The court held that her claim had no merit since "she made no substantial financial contribu-
tions to the business. ... Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 826 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (Supp. 1984).
86. Illinois Marriage & Dissolution of Marriage Act, Public Act No. 83-1362 art. II, § 49 (codi-
fied at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)).
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(2).
88. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY Acr § 14(b) (1983).
89. Id., Section 14 of the Act creates this exception. That portion of the Act reads as follows:
(b) Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intellectual
skill, creativity, or managerial activity on individual property of the other spouse creates marital
property attributable to that application if: (i) reasonable compensation is not received for the
application, and (ii) substantial appreciation of the individual property of the other spouse re-
sults from the application.
Id.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(6) (1984).
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separate.9 The policy underlying a claim to appreciation based on
homemaker services is that performance of those services enabled the
other spouse to devote himself more fully to the enhancement of his sepa-
rate property. "The presumption is that less effort would be devoted to
the business, and less enhancement in value would result if the business
participant had to divert some efforts to meal preparation or housekeep-
ing duties."92 Courts in New York, Kentucky, and Washington have
concluded that homemaker services should not be used to determine
whether an increase in separate property is marital or separate.93 The
Supreme Courts of both Montana and New Jersey have held that home-
maker services constitute a contribution sufficient to create a marital in-
terest in appreciation of separate property.94 In sum, a distinct minority
of states regard homemaker services as giving rise to a marital interest in
the appreciation of separate property.95
The majority of jurisdictions hold that increases in separate property
retain that character, absent a direct contribution by the non-titled
spouse.9 6 The opinion in an Iowa case is characteristic of the preference
of most courts for some direct relationship between contribution and in-
crease.97 The court held that a wife was entitled to share in the increased
value of her husband's separate property only to the extent that the in-
crease could be attributed to her efforts. "The underlying premise of our
analysis is that an equitable property division of the appreciated value of
the property should be a function of the tangible contributions of each
party and not the mere existence of the marital relationship."98 The term
active appreciation is thus frequently defined in terms of a direct contri-
bution to the increase in separate property by the non-titled spouse.
91. 2 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 22.09[4][a].
92. Id. This rationale has a basis in Spanish community property law. In discussing the con-
cept of onerous property, deFuniak notes that "joint efforts. . . may consist [of], as in the case of
the wife,. . . maintaining the home and rearing the children, for that is a sharing of the burdens of
the marital partnership and a contribution to the community effort." W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 34, § 62.
93. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of
Johnson, 28 Wash. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720 (1981).
94. In re Marriage of Brown, 587 P.2d 361 (Mont. 1978) (wife who worked part-time on a
ranch and provided homemaker services, held entitled to a portion of the appreciated value of hus-
band's separate property ranch); Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J. Super. 382, 448 A.2d 1035 (1982)
(homemaker services entitled wife to share in the amount of mortgage paydown on a house which
husband owned as separate property).
95. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, §§ 18.06,
20.09[4][a]. For a discussion of homemaker services, see Grossman & Casey, Valuation of a Home-
maker's Services, I EQUrr. DIST. REP. at 9 (Jan. 1981).
96. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 18.06.
97. In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
98. Id. at 815.
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2. What is Passive Appreciation?
The meaning of active appreciation has been more fully developed in
the case law than its corollary, passive appreciation. Passive apprecia-
tion has been described variously as attributable to inflation,99 to changes
in the law affecting business", and to general market conditions. 10 1
Thus it follows that the increase in value of publicly-traded stock would
be treated as passive appreciation and therefore as an increase in separate
property under section 50-20(b)(2). °2 Absent some showing that one of
the spouses effected the increase in market price,10 3 an increase in pub-
licly-traded stock will be treated as passive appreciation in equitable dis-
tribution and community property jurisdictions. Passive appreciation
has essentially been defined by exclusion. In opinions which recognize
the active/passive appreciation distinction, the threshold question has
been whether the increase was attributable to active appreciation. If not,
the increase has typically been characterized as passive in nature.
3. Valuation and The Widget Corporation
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted a liberal approach
toward active appreciation. To sustain a marital claim against an in-
crease in separate property, the non-titled spouse need not demonstrate a
direct contribution. The implications of this view are illustrated in the
context of the Widget, Inc. scenario.'°4 Susan concedes that she made no
contribution to the increase in value of Widget-direct or indirect, sub-
stantial or insubstantial. There were no homemaker services to consider.
Yet solely by virtue of her status as wife, Susan has a claim to the rise in
value of Widget stock. An award to Susan of any of the increased value
of Widget would not appear to further the remedial purpose of the equi-
table distribution act. The predicament of Widget highlights the signifi-
cance of whether active appreciation depends upon a showing of direct
contribution by the non-titled spouse.
The scenario described above is distinguishable from the facts upon
99. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 379, 325 S.E.2d 260, 268, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612,
330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
100. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 826 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
101. Jolis v. Jolis, 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
103. See Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1985) (held increase in husband's
stock portfolio marital property where husband left a salaried position to devote his full energies to
managing the stocks).
104. See supra pp 213-14. For the purpose of this illustration, however, further, assume that
when Susan met John, she had just passed the bar and was starting as an associate with a local law
firm. Within three years of their marriage, she became a partner in the firm. John and Susan chose
not to have children, both preferring to pursue their respective professional careers. They worked
long hours and had little time for or interest in domestic tasks. They employed a maid and a yard
service to maintain the home.
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which Wade v. Wade, Phillips v. Phillips and McLeod v. McLeod were
decided. In each of these cases, the court found a direct contribution by
the non-titled spouse. In Wade, the wife contributed significant sums of
money to the construction and maintenance of the marital home."0 5 In
Phillips, though the property was initially purchased with loans from the
corporation, these loans "eventually were paid for at least in part by in-
come earned during marriage."106 In McLeod, the court rejected the
wife's claim that her signature as co-guarantor on the loan to the corpo-
ration transmuted the redeemed shares into marital property; however,
the court did specifically recognize the contribution represented by her
signature. 1
0 7
B. Compensation-An Alternative to Active Appreciation?
In McLeod, the court of appeals rejected the husband's argument that
the marital interest in the corporation was limited to his salary.0 8 The
rationale behind the husband's argument was that the salary compen-
sated the marital estate for the effort he expended on his separate prop-
erty, the corporation. The concept of active appreciation is based on the
idea that such effort constitutes depletion of the marital estate.'0 9 Some
courts have held that the salary paid a corporate officer/shareholder
compensates the marriage for this depletion. These courts recognize a
marital interest deriving from the effort of the titled spouse; however, the
interest is represented by compensation received by that spouse rather
than by the increased value of the corporate stock. Compensation, there-
fore, is used as a means of apportioning the total increase. This approach
is recognized by all of the community property states ix and is the most
likely method of apportionment to be used where a corporation is
involved. "'
The leading case employing the compensation approach is Van Camp
v. Van Camp"2 . In this 1921 California case, the husband was majority
105. 72 N.C. App. at 378, 325 S.E.2d at 267.
106. 73 N.C. App. at 73, 326 S.E.2d at 60.
107. 74 N.C. App. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915. "We note, however, that where a spouse puts him
or herself at risk guaranteeing repayment of a loan whose proceeds do not partake of marital prop-
erty interests, courts have found the community entitled to an equitable lien for its contribution
.Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. See supra pp. 221-22 and accompanying notes.
110. Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979); Nace v. Nace, 104 Ariz. 20, 448
P.2d 76 (1978); Speer v. Quinlin, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1974); Katson v. Katson, 43 N.M.
214, 89 P.2d 524 (1939); Cord v. Neuhoff, 94 Nev. 21, 573 P.2d 1170 (1978); Jensen v. Jensen, 665
S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984); Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash. 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954).
111. King, supra note 46, at 488.
112. 53 Cal. App. 17, 28, 199 P. 885, 889 (1921). The salary system of apportionment was
developed as an alternative to a method adopted in an earlier case, Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103
P. 488 (1909). The method of apportionment adopted in Pereira is known as the "interest system."
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shareholder and president of Van Camp Seafood Company prior to the
marriage. He retained that position throughout the marriage and de-
voted all of his time to the company. He was paid a salary which was
applied to community uses. The court held that "while [the husband]
devoted his energies and personal efforts to making [the company] a suc-
cess, he was by the corporation paid what the evidence show[ed] was an
adequate salary, and for which another than himself with equal capacity
could have been secured."" 3 Therefore, the court held that the full value
of the company stock would be retained by the husband. 114
Under this method of apportionment, payment of salary by a corpora-
tion does not automatically insulate the appreciation in value of stock
from a marital claim. To insulate, the salary must be adequate compen-
sation to the marital estate for the cost of the titled spouse's effort. If not,
the court will impress a marital character on the amount of the apprecia-
tion equal to the difference between a fair salary and that actually re-
ceived." 5 Adequacy of compensation is generally determined with
reference to comparable commercial situations." 6
The compensation method of apportionment has not received much
attention in equitable distribution states. Missouri is the only equitable
distribution state that has used this method."' A Pennsylvania court
rejected the idea that salary adequately compensated the marital commu-
nity, holding that this idea was inconsistent with the economic partner-
ship principle underlying equitable distribution." 8 In McLeod, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the salary argument." 9 The
court based its conclusion on the degree of control the shareholder
Under the interest system, a fair rate of return is calculated on the value of the separate property at
the time of the marriage. The original value of the equity and the return are awarded to the owning
spouse as separate property, and the balance is awarded to the community. This system is still used
in some instances in California and in some other community property states. 1 VALUATION &
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 20.04[2].
113. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. at 28, 199 P. at 889.
114. Id. at 29, 199 P. at 890.
115. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Tassi v.
Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958); Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal. App. 2d 128, 274
P.2d 951 (1954); Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash. 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954); In re Buchanan's Estate, 89
Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916); see also I VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY,
supra note 36, § 20.04[2]; King, supra note 43, at 486.
Application of traditional corporate law principles would lead to the same result. The corporate
veil may be lifted where there is a finding that the corporate form has been used to circumvent public
policy. See R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-12 (1983).
The shortfall between actual and adequate compensation raises an inference of fraudulent intent.
Absent an effective rebuttal, this inference would provide grounds for disregarding the corporate
form; see infra pp. 232-34 and accompanying notes.
116. King, supra note 43, at 497.
117. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
118. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1091 (Pa. C.P. Jan. 1, 1985).
119. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, disc rep. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
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spouse has over the amount of salary paid. t" ° A majority shareholder
spouse could intentionally limit the amount of salary paid to himself,
thereby, undercompensating the marriage."2 ' Neither the Pennsylvania
court nor the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized adequacy of
compensation as a measure of the fairness of an apportionment of active
appreciation.
Application of the compensation approach to the Widget Corporation
requires the assumption of additional facts. At the time of his marriage
John's annual salary was $30,000. The year prior to the filing of the
divorce action, Widget paid John $125,000. John also received sizable
bonuses during ten of the previous fifteen years. His income and bonuses
were applied to marital expenses and assets. John's attorney offered evi-
dence showing that the compensation John received was comparable to
that paid to the presidents of similar-sized companies in the region.
Upon a showing of adequate compensation, should it matter that John
was employed by Widget, Inc. or IBM, Inc. so long as the corporate
integrity of each is properly maintained? Susan has made no direct con-
tribution to the growth of Widget, nor has she provided homemaker
services. Under these circumstances, should not John's substantial com-
pensation from Widget provide a fairer measure of the marital interest in
the company than the allocation of stock to Susan? The underpinning of
the economic partnership theory in this context is contribution by the
non-titled spouse to the enterprise. While most courts require direct con-
tribution, a minority of courts recognize homemaker services as sufficient
to create a marital interest in the increase of separate property. In the
absence of either direct contribution or homemaker services, a persuasive
argument can be made that the marital partnership has been sufficiently
remunerated for John's effort.
12 2
C. Equitable Distribution and the Corporate Veil
The potential erosion of a corporate law principle- separateness of
the corporate entity-is another issue raised by the Wade line of cases.
Though this issue was not briefed by either of the parties, the court made
reference to it in Phillips v. Phillips.13 "We do not believe that merely
by covering his transactions with the corporate veil plaintiff can claim
that any assets acquired thereby are wholly insulated from equitable dis-
tribution."'' 24 The issue therefore presented is whether creating a marital
interest in the appreciation of separate property stock violates the integ-
120. Id. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915.
121. There is no evidence of such an intent in McLeod. Id.
122. This argument raises the question whether the rise of two-career families will erode some of
the basis of the economic partnership model of marriage.
123. 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985).
124. Id., at 74, 326 S.E.2d at 61.
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rity of the corporate form as a distinct entity. Though yet to be
presented in North Carolina, the corporate veil question has been raised
in. this context in other jurisdictions.
The metaphor of the corporate veil is based on the concept of corpo-
rate separateness. A corporation is a legal entity "which is regarded in
law as having a personality and existence distinct from that of its several
members." 1 5 The distinction between the corporation and its sharehold-
ers is fundamental to the law of corporations.126 This distinction is the
essence of "corporateness." "[T]he corporate entity is distinct, although
all of its stock is owned by a single individual or corporation."'2 v If the
corporate existence is properly created and maintained, the shareholders'
personal obligations will not be enforced on the corporation. In turn, the
corporation's obligations will not be imposed on the non-director share-
holders beyond the value of their equity in the enterprise. "The corpora-
tion is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that makes it
impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its members."1 8
1. Disregarding The Corporate Entity
A court will disregard the corporate form and "pierce" the veil of sep-
arateness in limited circumstances. When the veil is pierced, the court
ignores the immunity that otherwise exists between the corporation and
its stockholders for their respective obligations. Piercing the corporate
veil is considered an extreme measure employed to "avoid the perpetra-
tion of a fraud or otherwise to serve the ends of justice."' 29 Disregarding
the corporate form is a remedy used "reluctantly and cautiously."130
A recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision reviewed the
grounds for disregarding the corporate entity.13
When a corporation is so operated that it is a mere instrumentality or
alter ego of the sole or dominant shareholder and a shield for its activities
in violation of the declared public policy or statute of the state, the corpo-
rate entity will be disregarded and the corporation and the shareholders
treated as one and the same person, it being immaterial whether the sole
or dominant shareholder is an individual or another corporation.'
32
Glenn v. Wagner133 enumerated a three-part test for determining
whether the corporation is the alter ego of the dominant shareholder.
125. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 307 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
126. R. ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 2-10.
127. Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 627, 112 S.E.2d 132, 134 (1960); R. ROBINSON,
supra note 115, § 2-10.
128. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930).
129. R. ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 2-12.
130. Id.
131. Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 329 S.E.2d 326 (1985).
132. Id. at 453, 329 S.E.2d at 329.
133. 313 N.C. 450, 329 S.E.2d 326 (1985).
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First, it must be shown that the corporation is dominated and controlled
by the shareholder.134 The court cited numerous factors which would
support a finding of domination and control, including non-compliance
with corporate formalities, "non-payment of dividends, insolvency of the
debtor corporation, siphoning of funds by the dominant shareholder,
non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate
records." 3 ' The second prong of the test requires evidence that the con-
trol has been used to "commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation
of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of plaintiff's legal rights. .. .""I Stated another way, the
corporate veil will be pierced when the corporate form is used to circum-
vent public policy and defeat the public interest.137 Third, the control
and fraud must be established as the proximate cause of the complain-
ant's injury.
138
2. Marital Property Distribution: Application of the Separateness
Doctrine
In the context of property distribution, the corporate separateness doc-
trine has been applied to determine the marital interest in an increase in
value of stock. Most of these decisions come from the community prop-
erty states, and they apply the separateness doctrine with predictable re-
sults. This doctrine has not been applied to determine the marital
interest in an increase in corporate retained earnings. However, cases
deciding this issue have based their decisions on related factors, e.g., the
degree of control exercised by the titled spouse.
a. Increased Stock Value
In a case where the husband owned ninety-nine and one-half percent
of the corporate stock, maintained a combined checking account both for
the corporation and for personal business, and used part of his salary to
defray corporate operating expenses, a Texas court held that the corpora-
tion was the alter ego of the husband and pierced the corporate veil. The
wife's claim to a community interest in the appreciation of his separate
property stock was sustained. 139 Once again relying on established prin-
ciples of corporate law, the same court resolved a later case against the
non-titled spouse refusing to pierce the corporate veil.""4 The wife ar-
134. Id. at 454-55, 329 S.E.2d at 330.
135. Id. at 458, 329 S.E.2d at 332.
136. Id. at 455, 329 S.E.2d at 330.
137. R. ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 2-12.
138. Glenn, 313 N.C. at 455, 329 S.E.2d at 330.
139. Uranga v. Uranga, 527 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); see Dillingham v. Dillingham,
434 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
140. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455 (rex. 1982). The court split five-to-four with the mi-
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gued that the appreciation in value of a restaurant was community prop-
erty. Evidence showed that cash was taken from the business for
personal expenses, that officers' and directors' meetings were not regu-
larly held, and that the business was operated by the titled spouse rather
than the officers and directors. While noting that the enterprise was not
operated by ideal business practices, the court concluded that there was
no indication that the husband's acts as president of the company were
committed for the purpose of defrauding his wife.
In equitable distribution states, the separateness doctrine generally
either has not been mentioned or has been subordinated to the remedial
purpose of the statute. "So far as equitable distribution principle is con-
cerned, there should be no essential difference between a situation in
which the husband has an interest in an individual business and one held
in a corporate name. The form should not control."
141
On the surface, application of the separateness doctrine as a defense to
equitable distribution appears questionable. A stock certificate simply
manifests an equity interest in a corporation.142 Stock is freely alienable
and can be transferred without impugning the integrity of the corporate
entity. Therefore, transferring to a non-titled spouse an amount of stock
which equals his share of the active appreciation does not raise a sepa-
rateness doctrine question. 43 However, if the court awards an asset of
the corporation rather than an equitable interest, the veil issue appears to
be more relevant. Absent a basis for disregarding the corporate entity,
should the court go "inside" the corporation and transfer its assets? On
the other hand, should the separateness doctrine restrict a court from
dealing with the interest in, rather than the assets of, the enterprise.
Again, an intent to circumvent public policy or to defeat the public
interest is a basis for piercing the corporate veil.'" A showing that the
titled spouse used the corporate form to improperly conceal assets or
income to stymie the intent of the equitable distribution law is a proper
nority registering a strong dissent, citing the community property principle that the efforts of one
spouse are presumed to be for the benefit of both. The dissent argued that community interests were
to be guarded with "jealous vigilance. The mere formation of a corporate entity, a legal fiction,
cannot be permitted to create an obstacle to a critical, equitable or proper analysis of the status of
marital property." Id. at 468. But cf. Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 112 S.E.2d 132
(1960). "But it leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction created by
law with intent that it should be acted on as if true." Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S.
19, 24 (1930). See also Mifflin v. Mifflin, 97 Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854 (1976) (court refused to
disregard the corporate entity to determine a community share in a corporation of which the hus-
band owned 249/250 shares where wife contended that the corporation was husband's alter ego);
Wells v. Hiskett, 288 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (corporate entity should not be disregarded
unless a well recognized basis exists for doing so).
141. Scherzer v. Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. 397, 400, 346 A.2d 434 (1975), cert. denied, 69 N.J.
391, 354 A.2d 319 (1976).
142. R. ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 17-2.
143. See infra pp. 240-44 for other issues raised by the distributive award.
144. R. ROBINSON, supra note 115, § 2-12.
23
Campen: The Wedding Veil or the Corporate Veil: Appreciation of Close Cor
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1985
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
basis for piercing the corporate veil under traditional principles of corpo-
rate law. This issue is brought into sharper focus by cases dealing specifi-
cally with claims against the retained earnings balance of a close
corporation.
b. Retained Earnings
In McLeod v. McLeod,'45 the North Carolina Court of Appeals sug-
gested in dicta that corporate retained earnings could be marital prop-
erty.146 "To suggest, as plaintiff does, that only his salary constitutes
martial property ignores the reality of a closely-held corporation wherein
persons in control have broad discretion in allocating salary, dividends,
and retained earnings."47 Courts in other states have addressed the is-
sue directly and have held that retained earnings either are or may be
marital property under some circumstances. 148 Retained earnings repre-
sent "the amount by which the shareholders' equity exceeds the par
value or stated value of the outstanding capital stock. It is, thus, growth
in value."' 149 The purposes served by retained earnings are to provide the
enterprise with working capital and to finance future growth. One ra-
tionale for subjecting retained earnings to equitable distribution is that
they represent "undistributed current income and have no pertinent rela-
tionship to the value of the previously acquired stock."' °
Courts not sympathetic to this argument have addressed it as a viola-
tion of the separateness doctrine. "Generally, the wife could not claim
the retained earnings as marital property, because the earnings and prof-
its of a corporation remain its property until severed from other corpo-
rate assets and distributed as dividends." '151 A related argument against
treatment of retained earnings as marital property is that it disregards
the legitimate business needs of the corporation.
The control of the titled spouse over retained earnings and the amount
of earnings retained in relation to the business needs of the corporation
have been the major factors considered by courts faced with this issue.
The reference to retained earnings by the McLeod court was made as an
example of one aspect of corporate finance subject to those in control of a
close corporation.' 52 This aspect was also considered in a Delaware deci-
sion. In J.D.P. v. F.J.H.,153 the husband appealed from a trial court
145. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, disc, rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
146. Id. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. J.D.P. v. F.J.H., 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979); Pascoe v. Pascoe, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1091
(Pa. C.P. Jan. 1, 1985).
149. 1 VALUATION & DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 36, § 22.07.
150. J.D.P., 399 A.2d at 209.
151. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 827 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (emphasis added).
152. 74 N.C. App. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915.
153. 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979).
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holding which characterized as marital property an increase in retained
earnings in a close corporation in which he held a separate property in-
terest. When he married, the husband owned a sixty-five percent interest
in two Delaware corporations. The retained earnings of both companies
increased substantially during the marriage. The husband argued that
the earnings were separate property and therefore exempt from equitable
distribution.' 4 His wife contended that the earnings were simply de-
ferred income. The court took note of the power a majority shareholder
holds over whether dividends are declared and what amount of dividends
are paid. The court noted that excluding retained earnings from consid-
eration as marital property would enable a majority shareholder spouse
to effectively insulate these earnings from all equitable claims.155 How-
ever, the court also held that the control factor alone was not conclusive
of the issue, and the characterization of the earnings surplus was a ques-
tion to be determined by all surrounding circumstances.
156
The control issue was also the focal point of the court's analysis in a
Missouri case dealing with retained earnings.157 In that case, the wife
appealed the trial court's finding that retained earnings were separate
property where her husband had a thirty-percent separate property inter-
est in the corporation in which he was chief executive officer, president,
and director. Two of his brothers and another officer comprised the re-
mainder of the board. The wife argued that her husband's position of
influence in the company permitted him to control and limit the amount
of earnings distributed, thereby enabling him to conceal disproportionate
sums under the corporate veil. The appellate court cited as significant
the fact that the husband was not a majority shareholder and that he was
only one of four members of the board which had the power to declare
dividends. The court held that in "the absence of evidence of collusion
with other board members to defraud petitioner of marital property by
minimizing dividends, the trial court finding will not be dis-
turbed .. ."158 In other words, the court was unconvinced that the
husband either possessed or exercised sufficient control over the amount
of earnings retained to defraud his wife by manipulation of the earnings
surplus.
While an unusually large retained earnings balance might raise the
154. The Delaware statute provides that all property acquired by either spouse after marriage is
presumptively marital property. However, the presumption is rebuttable if the property results from
an "increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage." 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1513(b)(3)(c) (1981).
155. J.D.P., 399 A.2d at 210.
156. Id. at 211. The case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of this and other
factors. The supreme court made it clear that just as retained earnings were not conclusively exempt
from equitable distribution, they were not always to be included. Id.
157. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984).
158. Id. at 827.
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specter of manipulation, other considerations might militate against such
a conclusion, e.g., legitimate business needs. The importance of consider-
ing the legitimate business uses of retained earnings was underscored by
a recent New York decision. In Jolis v. Jolis,159 the husband had re-
ceived a gift of stock in a family diamond business the year before his
marriage. The company was very successful, in part due to the hus-
band's efforts, but it had never declared a dividend. The wife claimed an
interest in the substantial earnings retained by the corporation. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of her claim and noted that
it was "undisputed that [the corporation] needed the accumulated sur-
plus to provide working capital for daily operations, including mainte-
nance of a $12,000,000 diamond inventory, and to comply with banking
agreement requirements."' "6 "Ordinary and necessary business reasons"
were also listed by the JD.P. court as a factor to be considered in the
evaluation of a marital claim on retained earnings.
161
In McLeod, the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the issues
of both control and business needs. The court suggested that proof of an
improper use of retained earnings would not be necessary to sustain a
marital claim. Under this view, proof of control is tantamount to proof
of the improper exercise of control. Nor would evidence of a legitimate
business need for the retained earnings balance vitiate the marital claim.
"A decision which is entirely sound from the standpoint of corporate
policy still might operate to the disadvantage of a shareholder's spouse so
as to deprive the spouse of a share of the fruits of the shareholder's
labor."
162
Control is a proper factor to consider in a marital claim on retained
earnings. However, should proof of control alone be prima facie evi-
dence of an improper exercise of that power? If the titled spouse has
manipulated the earnings surplus so as to insulate income from equitable
distribution, a sound basis exists for piercing the corporate veil. Tradi-
tional principles of corporate law provide for disregarding the corporate
entity where the corporate form has been used to circumvent public pol-
icy. On the other hand, to treat retained earnings as marital property
159. 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983). The court also made reference to the tax implica-
tions for the corporation of retaining an excessive earnings surplus. "DDI's books have been ex-
amined annually by Internal Revenue agents, and these audits had never resulted in a finding that
DDI's retained earnings account was excessive, a finding which would have resulted in a substantial
tax penalty to DDI." Id. at 693, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 586. A Missouri court declined to consider the
size of a surplus earnings account, stating that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine that
issue since the corporation was not a party to the action. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 827 (Mo. 1984).
The court also noted that the petitioner was without standing to challenge action of the corporation's
board.
160. Jolis, 98 A.D.2d at 693, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
161. 399 A.2d at 211.
162. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d at 830).
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without such evidence would violate the doctrine of corporate
separateness.
The size of the retained earnings balance is also a proper factor to
consider in a marital claim on retained earnings. However, should the
size of the balance alone be prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud
the non-titled spouse? A large retained earnings balance which is not
required by legitimate business needs supports an inference of an intent
to defraud. If not rebutted, this inference provides a sound basis for
piercing the corporate veil. Absent these circumstances, characterizing
retained earnings as marital property would also be an improper viola-
tion of the integrity of the corporate entity.
3. The Separateness Doctrine and the Widget Corporation
The integrity of the fictitious Widget Corporation is unassailable. The
corporation was duly organized under the laws of North Carolina and
was operated in strict accord with those laws. There is nothing in the
recorded activity of this company which would provide a basis for disre-
garding the corporate form. There is also no evidence of an attempt to
circumvent the remedial purpose of the equitable distribution law. John
has not improperly exercised his control position with the corporation,
and the retained earnings balance is a consequence of economic fac-
tors.'63 Nevertheless, Susan has a legitimate claim under the Wade line
of cases, not only to the stock of the company, but to its assets and,
specifically, to its retained earnings.
In Phillips1 and McLeod, 6 ' the claims on stock appreciation were
not considered in relation to corporate law principles. However, consid-
eration of Susan Jennings' claim on Widget stock value without reference
to the doctrine of corporate separateness may be an unnecessary assault
on the corporate form. Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable excep-
tion to the legal doctrine of corporate separateness by which fairness can
be accorded to both the marital and the corporate estates. A persuasive
argument can be made that the equities in the Jennings' divorce weigh
more heavily in favor of the corporation than the "economic partner-
ship" of the marriage.
163. These "economic factors" include the following: John's two uncles own all the company
stock not held by John. They have served on the board of directors since the inception of the com-
pany, and each serves as an officer. The uncles have taken an active role both on the board and as
officers. In late 1984, the economy showed signs of an oncoming recession, and the prime rate had
risen from ten to thirteen percent within a few months. The company had a large backlog of orders.
The raw material required to make widgets is very expensive; therefore, during the fall quarter, the
board decided to build up its retained earnings account to minimize the need for borrowing at the
higher rate. Dividends were regularly declared by the Widget board but were necessarily smaller in
1984 and 1985.
164. 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985).
165. 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
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D. The Distributive Award: Its Impact on Other Shareholders
1. The Widget Corporation
Beyond its implications for corporate law, the manner in which the
marital interest in active appreciation is awarded has a substantial impact
on the corporation's other shareholders. Relying on McLeod, Susan
claims a one-half interest in the appreciated value of John's Widget
stock. For illustrative purposes, assume the trial court finds the follow-
ing facts: Widget, Inc. has a current value of $6,000,000; John's interest
is worth $3,600,000, of which $300,000 represents his pre-marital inter-
est, or separate property; $650,000166 represents passive appreciation in
the value of John's initial capital; the remainder of John's interest is at-
tributed to active appreciation and is classified as marital- property.
Based on these facts, the court awards Susan a lump sum cash award
equivalent to one half of this sum, or $1,325,000.
If John is not able to finance the amount of the judgment and the other
shareholders fail to buy enough of John's shares to yield the judgment
amount, John would be forced to liquidate his Widget stock. In doing so,
the close corporation would be essentially lost as an entity. The conse-
quences of Jenning's divorce are entirely conceivable under the Wade
line of cases. This final chapter of the Widget scenario highlights the
significance of the distributive award and its impact on the corporation
and its other shareholders.
The North Carolina equitable distribution statute gives the court wide
discretion to fashion an award of marital property.1 67 Among these op-
tions are an in-kind distribution, a cash award, or an adjustment of ali-
mony after the equitable distribution proceeding.
2. The Types of Distributive Awards
a. In-kind Distribution
In the Jennings/Widget scenario, the district court could order an in-
kind distribution of stock, equivalent to the non-titled spouse's interest in
the appreciated value of the company. This option creates the potential
for significant management problems for the corporation. One of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the close corporation is that the "relation-
ship between the participants, like that among partners, is one which
requires close cooperation and a high degree of good faith and mutual
respect .... ,,t61 The North Carolina Supreme Court quoted one com-
166. This figure is the current value of John's pre-marital interest based on eight percent growth
over fifteen years.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984).
168. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983) (quoting 2 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.02 (2d ed. 1971)).
240
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mentator who observed that "[a]n organizational structure of this nature
[the close corporation]-in which the investment interests are interwoven
with continuous, often daily, interaction among the principals-necessar-
ily requires substantial trust among the individuals." '169 This trust and
close cooperation is not likely to be extended to a divorced spouse who
may acquire not only stock through the divorce but also hold a seat on
the board of directors. If the new stockholder is unreceptive to a
purchase offer from the original shareholders, they may prefer voluntary
dissolution of the corporation.
170
If dissolution is not sought, the potential exists for discord among the
shareholders and distrust by the new shareholder of management deci-
sions made by the majority. In turn, if this shareholder's reasonable ex-
pectations of stock ownership are frustrated, he may seek involuntary
dissolution of the corporation.1 7 1 This raises an interesting question of
what the reasonable expectations of such a stockholder would be. How-
ever, there is language in the landmark Meiselman v. Meiselman1 72 deci-
sion that arguably supports the position of such an outsider shareholder.
The language is found in the North Carolina Supreme Court's rebuttal of
the argument that a minority shareholder should bargain for protection
of his expectations before agreeing to accept a minority position in a
close corporation:
[W]hen a minority shareholder receives his shares in a close corporation
from another in the form of a gift or inheritance, as did the plaintiff here,
the minority shareholder never had the opportunity to negotiate for any
sort of protection with respect to the 'reasonable expectations' he had or
hoped to enjoy in the close corporation.
173
Therefore, could the shareholder who acquired a minority position by
equitable distribution successfully argue that he did not have an opportu-
nity to negotiate for protection of his rights and thereby force dissolution
of the corporation?
b. Cash Award
Choice of a cash award to the non-titled spouse does not necessarily
avoid problems of the type discussed above. The court may choose a
lump sum payment or a payment over time. 74 The demise of Widget
described supra is a potential consequence of lump sum cash award. A
169. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983) (quoting Com-
ment, Deadlock and Dissolution in the Close Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered?, 58
NEB. L. REV. 791, 795 (1979)).
170. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-117 to -118. (1982).
171. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 279, 307 S.E.2d at 551 (1983).
172. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
173. Id. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 558-59.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (1984).
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recent California decision indicated that courts are concerned about the
potential consequence of a cash award. 175 Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals rejected a wife's argument that the trial court's in-kind distribution
of her husband's separately-owned, close corporation stock should be re-
jected as unfair and that a cash award would be more equitable. The
court noted that the trial court had taken "careful account of matters of
liquidity, restrictions on transfer, and tax consequences, . . . and
concluded that it would be unfair and unworkable to require the husband
or the corporation to cash the wife out.
c. Alimony Modification
Another option available to the court would eliminate the potential
problems described above in certain circumstances. The equitable distri-
bution statute specifies that equitable distribution shall be made without
regard to alimony. However, it also provides that "[a]fter the determina-
tion of an equitable distribution, the court, upon request of either party,
shall consider whether an order for alimony or child support should be
modified. . . . ,,77 Where alimony is ordered, the non-titled spouse's
share of active appreciation could be apportioned through the alimony
award. This approach would preserve corporate ownership and leave
management intact by linking the property distribution to alimony.
However, inasmuch as alimony is based on fault, this type of award is of
limited utility.
178
3. Impact of Award
The type of distributive award chosen by the court may have a signifi-
cant impact on other shareholders of the corporation and thus result in
competing equities-equity for the non-titled spouse against equity for
the other shareholders. Only a handful of cases have dealt with this is-
sue. 17  A New Jersey appellate court reviewed a trial court's award to
the wife of a fifty-percent interest in her husband's corporation as her
marital interest in the enterprise. The court overturned the award indi-
cating that this award could lead to corporate deadlock and ultimately
force dissolution.'8 0 In JD.P. v. F.J.H.,1l the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized the impact on other shareholders as a factor in determining
whether retained earnings should be characterized as marital property.
175. Behrens v. Behrens, 137 Cal. App. 3d 562, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (1982).
176. Id. at. 572, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 205.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(F) (1984).
178. Id. § 50-16.2 (1984).
179. J.D.P. v. F.J.H., 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979); Bowen v. Bowen 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73
(1984); Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 393 A.2d 583 (App. Div. 1978).
180. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 393 A.2d 583 (App. Div. 1978).
181. 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979).
30
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1985], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/3
WEDDING VEIL OR CORPORATE VEIL
While this question has not yet arisen under section 50-20(b)(2),
the North Carolina Supreme Court has considered other shareholders in
a related context. Justice Martin, concurring in Meiselman, observed
that:
the court [in deciding whether the complaining shareholder's reasonable
expectations have been frustrated] should also consider what effect the
granting of relief will have upon the corporation and other shareholders.
Will it interfere with the corporation's ability to attract financing for its
business? Will it interfere with its ability to attract additional capital?
Will it require burdensome financing upon the corporation or the share-
holders? Will it interfere with the rights of creditors? If a buy-out of
plaintiff's shares is forced upon the company, it may be far from painless.
If it is determined that the granting of relief will be unduly burdensome
to the corporation or other shareholders, the trial court should consider
this in determining whether to grant relief and, if so, whether this should
affect the purchase price or value attached to plaintiff's shares or the
method of payment. It is an equitable proceeding.
182
The balance of interests suggested by Justice Martin also has its place in
the context presently being considered. The same considerations out-
lined above should be taken into account in fashioning an award of the
marital interest in active appreciation. It might be argued that consider-
ation of the distributional factors 8 3 under the statute would prevent an
inequitable result. However, the distributional factors do not take into
account the adverse impact on business that the property settlement pro-
ceeding itself will have in the wake of the Wade line of cases.
Another issue facing close corporation shareholders is the effect of
shareholders' agreements concerning stock transfers. Should the court
be constrained by a shareholders' agreement from effecting an in-kind
stock transfer to award the non-titled spouse his or her share of the ac-
tive appreciation? While this specific question has not yet been an-
swered, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the same general issue
in Castonguay v. Castonguay.84 In this case, the total value of the hus-
band's forty-three percent share of close corporation stock was in dispute
rather than only the appreciation. The articles of incorporation prohib-
ited stock transfers without the stock first being offered to other share-
holders or to the corporation. Nonetheless, the trial court chose an in-
kind stock distribution to award the wife her marital interest in the cor-
poration. The supreme court held that the transfer restriction did not
apply in a divorce property distribution in the absence of a specific provi-
sion in the shareholders' agreement to that effect.185
182. 309 N.C. at 316, 307 S.E.2d at 572-73 (Martin, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984).
184. 306 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 1981).
185. Id. at 145.
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A related issue was considered in-depth by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. The question in Bowen v. Bowen 186 was whether the valuation
formula fixed in the shareholders' agreement controlled the court's valu-
ation of the close corporation for equitable distribution purposes. The
agreement excluded goodwill and other intangible assets from the valua-
tion formula. The supreme court held that the agreement did not control
because it did not contemplate valuation for the purpose of equitable dis-
tribution. 187 Both Castonguay and Bowen suggest that a court might give
authority to a shareholders' agreement which specifically addresses dis-
tribution of a divorced shareholder's interest in the company.
V. CONCLUSION
In Wade v. Wade, Phillips v. Phillips, and McLeod v. McLeod, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals significantly redefined the meaning of
separate property under North Carolina's equitable distribution stat-
ute. 88 Under these decisions, an increase in separate property is no
longer necessarily separate property as provided by the statute.189 In-
stead, the increase attributable to active appreciation is now considered
marital property. The court has defined active appreciation as a contri-
bution by either spouse to the increase in value. In the context of a close
corporation, these principles will often subject the major portion of the
corporation's share value to equitable distribution.
The parties in Wade, Phillips and McLeod did not raise, and the court
did not consider, the plethora of important issues these decisions raise for
North Carolina close corporations. The purpose of this Comment has
been to explore some of these issues in light of the principles developed in
the Wade line and against the larger backdrop of American case law.
The significance of the definition of active appreciation has been high-
lighted, and a variety of alternative approaches have been discussed. The
advantages of the compensation method have been considered as a means
of apportioning the marital interest in active appreciation. The threat to
the close corporation posed by active appreciation has been examined.
In turn, this Comment has considered the suitability of the corporate
separateness doctrine as a framework for analysis of marital claims on
the value of stock and retained earnings. Finally, the impact of a distrib-
utive award under the Wade line of cases has been discussed and the
implications of the award for other shareholders.
Answers to the questions raised here will require a close association
between two areas of law which traditionally have been considered to be
186. 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73 (1984).
187. Id. at 46-47, 473 A.2d at 78.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(B)(2) (1984).
189. Id.
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distinctly separate-the law of corporations and domestic relations.
Also, the district court bench will increasingly find itself faced with cor-
porate law issues with which it traditionally has had little experience.
In the Wade line of cases, the court of appeals set aside the corporate
veil in deference to the "wedding veil" which protects the economic part-
nership concept of marriage. Because the corporate law issues raised
here were not argued by the parties in these cases, the corporate veil lost
by default. The corporate separateness doctrine and its equitable excep-
tion can accommodate the remedial objectives underlying Wade, Phillips,
and McLeod. Use of this doctrine in the consideration of marital claims
on separate property stock would avoid the potential for unfair results
suggested here without sacrificing fairness to the marital partnership.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has denied discretionary review of
Wade 190 and McLeod191. However, a record in which the corporate law
issues are fully developed may lead to a reconsideration of the rule devel-
oped in these cases.
HENRY C. CAMPEN, JR.
190. 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
191. 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985).
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